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Abstract- We present enhancements to our 
network-based intrusion detection system, which 
makes use of multiple neural network classifiers 
to accurately detect several classes of attacks 
including stealthy probes and novel denial-of-
service attacks.  An intrinsic representation of the 
local network and detection features derived from 
network traffic enable the system to detect entire 
attack classes.  Improvements to our system 
include enhanced robust TCP session 
reconstruction, handling simplex and duplex 
traffic modes, an expanded feature vector that 
includes measures of inter-packet delays and 
counts of anomalous TCP sessions, and binary 
tree-based internal data structures which are 
faster and less vulnerable to attack.  Our system 
achieves a detection rate of 100% with a false 
alarm rate of .1% when tested against stealthy 
attacks in the DARPA 1999 IDS Evaluation. It 
also performs well on a moderately loaded 
research network. 
.  
Index terms—intrusion detection, security, probe; 
denial-of-service, neural networks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As more people make use of the Internet, their 
computers and the valuable data they contain become 
exposed to attackers lying in wait in cyberspace.  
Attackers are constantly scanning the Internet for 
victim machines that can be broken into and 
commandeered in order to suit their malicious 
purposes, such as, the enlistment of new zombies for 
distributed denial-of-service attacks, the unauthorized 
use of network storage resources or the defacement 
of corporate or government web-pages.  In order to 
protect computer systems, network-based intrusion 
detection systems (IDSs) have been developed to 
analyze Internet traffic and recognize when attackers 
are at work probing a network or attacking a 
machine. State-of-the-art network-based intrusion 
detection systems detect attackers by comparing 
network traffic with signatures of known attacks.  
Knowledgeable attackers can alter the details of 
many attacks to avoid using the short signatures 
detected by these systems. System Design 
 In this paper, we present enhancement to 
our network-based intrusion detection system, which 
makes use of multiple neural network classifiers to 
accurately detect several classes of attacks including 
stealthy probes and novel denial-of-service attacks.  
Improvements to our sisteym include enhanced 
robust TCP session reconstruction, handling of 
simplex and duplex traffic modes, an expanded 
feature vector that includes measures of inter-packet 
delays and counts of anomalous TCP sessions, and 
binary tree-based internal data structures which are 
faster and less vulnerable to attack. 
 This paper is organized as follows.  We 
begin with a description of our system architecture, 
going into some detail about our internal data 
structures.  Section III discusses the enhanced feature 
extraction methods employed in our system.  In 
section IV, we present the results from training and 
testing our system on traffic data from the DARPA 
1998 and 1999 evaluations.  Following a brief 
discussion of our results of feature selection we close 
with a conclusion and general discussion about 
network-based intrusion detection and some 
suggestions for follow-on work. 
 
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
As depicted in Figure 1, our system contains 
several modules that permit the analysis of network 
data for the purposes of detection network intrusions. 
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Fig. 1. Diagram of processing modules in our 
network-based intrusion detetion system. 
 
After reception of the network data, the data 
analysed and compiled into connections by the 
Psplice connection-parsing library described in the 
next section.  This library supports the intrusion 
detection application, by taking care of organizing 
traffic on the network into coherent connection 
streams.  The application receives indications from 
the Psplice library when important ‘events’ occur on 
the connection such as: OPEN – when the 3-way 
handshake is received; DATA – when data is 
received on the connection, and CLOSE – when the 
connection is closed for any reason, such as a reset 
condition or normal 3-way goodbye. 
 
A. Psplice Connection-Parsing Library 
Psplice is a library, written in C++, for reliably 
reassembling the data transferred in a TCP 
connection from a packet stream despite attempts by 
a malicious host to confuse it.  Specifically, it is 
resilient in the face of many of the attacks discussed 
in [reference to Ptachek and Neuman paper].  The 
Psplice library allows applications to treat TCP 
stream reassembly as a “black box” in which packets 
from multiple connections are input and connection 
information, along with the data transferred in those 
connections, is output.  Furthermore, applications 
which need more precise control over exactly how 
data is reassembled or special cases are handled can 
extend or replace certain key classes without having 
to modify the library’s framework. 
 Psplice maintains accurate connection state 
by delaying the decision on whether to accept or drop 
a packet until the recipient’s response to that packet 
can be observed.  Instead of attempting to predict if a 
packet will reach a host and how it will be handled, 
Psplice simply observes the hosts response to see if 
the connection state on that host has changed, 
indicating the packet was accepted and acted upon.  
Using the recipient’s response to directly observe a 
packet’s fate prevents an attacker from taking 
advantage of network topology or operating system 
specific behavior to craft a packet that would be 
either dropped by the recipient but accepted by 
Psplice or vice versa.  While combinations of attacks 
are still able to confuse it, Psplice’s packet 
verification techniques make inserting or spurious 
packets or causing packets to be erroneously dropped 
much more difficult. 
B. Internal Data Structures 
Changes were made to the internal data structures 
of our system to support enhanced real-time detection 
of stealthy and distributed attacks and to reduce the 
effects of an attack against the system itself.  In 
general, all internal data tables are binary-tree based 
data structures, which are less vulnerable to attack 
than linked-list data structures and promise 
predictable insert and search time requirements. 
Several data structures are used to characterize 
the local network on which the system is deployed to 
provide the system with an idea of normal traffic and 
host configurations.  The first of these data structures 
is the network profile table which tracks connections 
to local hosts by frequency.  The ARP and DHCP 
data structures track IP/Mac Address mappings and 
general network configuration information for the 
purposes of recognizing denial-of-service attacks 
which attempt to ‘poison’ a host’s configuration 
through spoofing. 
The connection anomaly table tracks the 
anomalous-ness of each new connection seen on the 
network by first checking the network profile table 
for it’s likelihood.  A score derived from the 
likelihood of this connection occurring, is used as 
part of the feature vector delivered to the 
classification engines and helps to discover rare 
connection events that might indicate the presence of 
a stealthy probe. 
A central table of denial-of-service alerts is used 
as a clearinghouse for all  DoS alerts issued by the 
system.  The purpose of this table is to support the 
the detection of distributed DoS attacks. A separate 
algorithm considers DoS type (determined during 
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classifcation), source IP network and time and 
duration of attack to group separate DoS alerts 
together and attempt to recognize a distributed attack. 
C. Enhanced Processing of Events 
In addition to the in-band event-driven processing 
that acts upon individual connection events delivered 
from the psplice library, our system utilizes periodic 
timer event mechanism to permit out-of-band 
processing of alerts.  Such out-of-band processing 
includes the timing-out of alerts that are being 
considered in the Alert table and to consider 
individual DoS alerts as part of a distributed alert 
scheme.   As depicted in Figure 2 
 
Fig. 2. Processing loop for real-time connection 
events and out-of-band maintenance and alert 
aggregation.  In-band connection event 
processing is complemented by out-of-band alert 
time-out and aggregation. 
D. Output Control/Throttling 
A final new data structure supports the output of 
the intrusion detection system by controlling the flow 
of out going alerts issued.    All alerts are labeled 
with their specific characteristics including: src/dst 
IP, src/dst Port, type of alert, time of occurrence.  
This enables alerts of the same intrusion event to be 
grouped together and allows only the first alert in a 
series of alerts needs to be issued.   A major 
complaint of many intrusion detection systems is that 
they tend to produce a flood of alerts during an attack 
often overwhelming the analyst. This change 
attempts to remedy the problem by stemming the 
flow of alerts. Several configuration parameters, such 
as alert-timeout period and the frequency and count 
of alerts during an on-going attack, enable the control 
of this feature to match deployment 
requirements.[need reference]; 
A second way in which the system is improved is 
through the use of throttling on the alerts produced.  
Often an intrusion detection system can produce 
many alerts during an attack, one for each connection 
or network event that appears to be part of an attack.  
In our system we make use of some simple heuristics 
to throttle the flow of alerts being issued to the 
system administrator.  The first of these heuristics 
involves a time window surrounding the production 
an alert.   This time window suppresses all identical 
alerts produced by the system after the first one for a 
period extending 20 seconds beyond the receipt of 
the last alert produced for this alert. 
 Alert throttling 
  Heuristics provide guide for alert 
throttling 
 Require more than 1 alert for DoS attack  
 Alert only once every 20 seconds 
 Stop inundation with alerts 
 Configurable to administrators likings. 
. 
E. Feature Extraction and Classification 
Our system relies upon individual neural-network 
classifiers to detect the presence of probe and denial-
of-service attacks in network data.  In this section we 
describe the feature vector that is constructed from 
connection data and connection history and presented 
to the neural network classifier.  
1) Feature Vector 
Several improvements were made to our method 
of extracting features from connection data.  These 
improvements in the feature vector take advantage of 
the closer connection to actual network traffic which 
is supported by the psplice library.  For examples, 
Psplice provides an indication to the intrusion 
detection system when the first SYN packet is 
received on a new connection rather than waiting for 
the full 3-way handshake to complete.  This early 
indication of the a connection attempt supports the 
intrusion detection applications tracking of 
uncompleted connections and enables it to detect 
attacks that utilize this stealth mode of connecting in 
order to probe a system or to hide from being 
reported in a system log. 
The feature vector contained elements that 
monitor immediate packet information as well as 
aggregate information dependent upon the source or 
destination IP address and application port.  The 
complete feature vector included: an indication of the 
connection state: opened or closed; the protocol: tcp, 
udp or icmp; an indication of strangeness in the 
connection as reported by psplice: no TCP FIN flag, 
TCP reserved bits set; unusual connection: strange 
IP/PORT combination, source IP from inside 
network (based upon network configuration); packet 
fragment information: # of overlapping fragments, # 
of enclosed fragments; features of connection close 
events: # to same host, # to same service, # abnormal 
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connections; features of connection open events: # to 
same host, # to same service; ratio of open to close 
events: ratio to same host, ratio to same service; 
connection timing: same host open interval, same 
host close interval; and raw connection counts: # 
different services connected to, # connections to 
same service, # icmp echos from source. 
F. Neural Network Classifiers 
Our system employs individual neural classifiers 
for each of the attacks which it is trying to detect and 
classify.  Probe classifiers include ipsweep, 
portsweep and satan attack, while denial-of-service 
classifiers include the neptune, smurf and teardrop 
attacks. Each of the classifiers is trained with feature 
vectors compiled from examples of attack and non-
attack data.  The set of attack examples includes 
features vectors compiled for only the attack relevant 
to the classifier.  While the set of ‘normal’ examples 
includes feature vectors compiled from normal, non-
attack traffic and examples from the other attacks.  
The addition of other-attack data to the ‘normal’ data 
set, represents a modification in the training regimen 
from our previous system and was an attempt to 
teach the neural classifiers  to improve the specificity 
of the detections. 
All classifiers were multi-layer perceptrons 
trained off-line using the LNKNet pattern recognition 
library from Lincoln [Reference needed].  The output 
from this LNKNet library is a set of trained detectors 
which are easily incorporated into the intrusion 
detector’s application software. 
III. RESULTS 
A. Training and Testing Methodology 
Our system was trained and tested against data 
from the 1998 and 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection 
System Evaluation carried out by MIT Lincoln 
Laboratory [6][20].   This dataset contains examples 
of many types of attacks included user-to-root and 
remote-to-local attacks as well as other OS-
dependent attacks.  For the purposes of our system, 
however, we focused on stealthy probe attacks as 
denial-of-service attacks.  The format for the 
evaluation is of individual files for each day of the 
test stored in tcpdump format.  
For training our system, we extracted individual 
examples of probe and denial-of-service attacks from 
the 1998 training and test data and the 1999 training 
data. For each attack file, feature vectors were 
compiled and then utilized to train the neural 
classifiers.  The neural classifiers were trained using 
10-fold cross-validation to discriminate between their 
specific attack class and the other attack classes and 
normal traffic. 
When presented with original tcpdump files from 
the two weeks of testing, the system performed as 
shown in Figure XX.  As shown in the figure, the 
system did quite well, achieving detection and 
classification of all of the stealth attacks  with a very 
low false alarm rate of < 1% per day.  This represents 
a significant improvement over the performance of 
the previous system. 
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Figure XXX presents classification results for our 




Fig. 3. System Accuracy on Probe attacks from the 
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    Figure IV presents the results classification for 




Fig. 4. System Accuracy on  Denial-of-Service 
attacks from the 1999 DARPA Evaluation 
IV. FEATURE SELECTION 
Improved performance of our intrusion detection 
system is in part to many of the enhancements we 
have made, not the least of which includes the 
addition of new features elements.  In an effort to 
understand the source the improved detection, we 
performed backward feature selection on the training 
data. In backward feature selection, the goal is to  
being with a complete feature vector and gradually 
remove the element that has the least effect on the 
performance of the classifier.  In the end you are left 
with a minimal set of features that support the desired 
classification rate. Figure 5 presents the classification 
error as a function of feature number.  From the 
figure it appears that most important features for the 
detection of probes and denial-of-service attacks are 
2,6, 21, 8 and finally feature 17.  These features 
correspond to  
2- ICMP FLAG 
6 STRANGE IP/PORT 
21 SAME HOST OPEN TIME CNT 
8 INSIDE IP 




Fig. 5. Results of feature selection based upon 
misclassification of training set vectors 
V. FUTURE WORK 
Future enhancements to our system include 
dynamice network map building that take a cuu from 
system administrators as to the configuration of the 
network.  This can assist the detection algorithm in 
ruling out potential false alarms by recognizing 
common behavior from known machines. 
Other further work would include the  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Our enhancements to our network-based intrusion 
detection make a system with incredible potential. 
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